feat(sandbox): Landlock TCP port restriction in Platform mode

When Platform mode is active, apply Landlock ABI v4 network rules to
restrict TCP connect to only the proxy port (default 3128). This makes
the loopback CONNECT proxy mandatory at the kernel level -- a process
calling connect() to any other port gets EACCES before any packet is
created.

This closes the cooperative proxy gap: without this, processes ignoring
HTTP_PROXY could bypass the proxy and connect directly. With this,
enforcement is at the kernel LSM layer (Tier 1), same as Landlock
filesystem restrictions.

Graceful degradation: if the kernel does not support Landlock ABI v4
(RHEL 9.5 or earlier), the network rules are silently skipped and
enforcement falls back to the cooperative proxy + NetworkPolicy.

1 file changed, +43/-3 lines. Compiles, tests pass, clippy clean.

Ref: NVIDIA#899

Author: Ladas

crates/openshell-sandbox/src/sandbox/linux/landlock.rs

@@ -3,10 +3,10 @@
 
 //! Landlock filesystem sandboxing.
 
-use crate::policy::{LandlockCompatibility, SandboxPolicy};
+use crate::policy::{LandlockCompatibility, NetworkMode, SandboxPolicy};
 use landlock::{
-    ABI, Access, AccessFs, CompatLevel, Compatible, PathBeneath, PathFd, PathFdError, Ruleset,
-    RulesetAttr, RulesetCreatedAttr,
+    ABI, Access, AccessFs, AccessNet, CompatLevel, Compatible, NetPort, PathBeneath, PathFd,
+    PathFdError, Ruleset, RulesetAttr, RulesetCreatedAttr,
 };
 use miette::{IntoDiagnostic, Result};
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
@@ -184,6 +184,15 @@ pub fn prepare(policy: &SandboxPolicy, workdir: Option<&str>) -> Result<Option<P
             .handle_access(access_all)
             .into_diagnostic()?;
 
+        // Platform mode: also handle TCP connect access so Landlock can
+        // restrict which ports the agent connects to. Requires ABI v4.
+        // The compat_level handles graceful degradation on older kernels.
+        if matches!(policy.network.mode, NetworkMode::Platform) {
+            ruleset = ruleset
+                .handle_access(AccessNet::ConnectTcp)
+                .into_diagnostic()?;
+        }
+
         let mut ruleset = ruleset.create().into_diagnostic()?;
         let mut rules_applied: usize = 0;
 
@@ -207,6 +216,37 @@ pub fn prepare(policy: &SandboxPolicy, workdir: Option<&str>) -> Result<Option<P
             }
         }
 
+        // Platform mode: restrict TCP connect to the proxy port only.
+        // Uses Landlock ABI v4 (LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP). If the
+        // kernel doesn't support ABI v4, the rule is silently skipped
+        // (best_effort) and enforcement falls back to NetworkPolicy.
+        if matches!(policy.network.mode, NetworkMode::Platform) {
+            let proxy_port = policy
+                .network
+                .proxy
+                .as_ref()
+                .and_then(|p| p.http_addr)
+                .map_or(3128_u16, |addr| addr.port());
+
+            match ruleset.add_rule(NetPort::new(proxy_port, AccessNet::ConnectTcp)) {
+                Ok(r) => {
+                    ruleset = r;
+                    debug!(
+                        port = proxy_port,
+                        "Landlock allow TCP connect (proxy port only)"
+                    );
+                    rules_applied += 1;
+                }
+                Err(e) => {
+                    debug!(
+                        error = %e,
+                        "Landlock TCP port restriction unavailable (ABI v4 required), \
+                         falling back to cooperative proxy enforcement"
+                    );
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
         if rules_applied == 0 {
             return Err(miette::miette!(
                 "Landlock ruleset has zero valid paths — all {} path(s) failed to open. \